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THE FINANCIAL INTEREST AND SYNDICATION RULES
-TAKE TWO
Tamber Christian'
The Federal Communications Commission
("FCC" or "Commission") enacted the financial in-
terest and syndication ("fin-syn") rules in 1970 in
response to concerns that the broadcast television
networks were unfairly dominating the supply of tel-
evision programs to television stations throughout the
United States. The fin-syn rules restrict the ability of
television networks, primarily American Broadcast-
ing Company, Inc. ("ABC"), National Broadcasting
Company, Inc. ("NBC") and CBS Inc. ("CBS"), to
acquire ownership and distribution rights in televi-
sion programs. The Commission adopted the fin-syn
rules out of concern that the networks would use
their dominance among television viewers to exercise
monopsony power when acquiring programs from
producers and monopoly power when distributing
these programs to stations unaffiliated with the
networks.
In 1970, ABC, NBC and CBS comprised virtually
the entire video industry. Since that time, cable tele-
vision service has emerged to the point of .nearly of-
fering five hundred channels, video cassette recorders
("VCRs") have taken up residence in over seventy
percent of American homes, Fox Broadcasting Com-
pany ("Fox") has become a serious competitor to the
traditional three networks, and the Warner Brothers
Network ("WB Network") and the United Para-
mount Network ("UPN") recently joined the fight
for a respectable audience share. None of this existed
in 1970. Although the broadcast industry has
changed significantly since 1970, the FCC still holds
the traditional three networks accountable to the fin-
syn rules, albeit less restrictive than when first en-
acted. This Article traces the history of the fin-syn
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' See In re Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's
Rules, 23 F.C.C.2d 382, para. 7 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 Or-
der], afi'd sub nom. Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442
rules as they existed in 1970, the FCC's changes to
those rules in 1991, and the FCC's response to the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' remand of the fin-
syn rules.
I. PRE-1991 FIN-SYN RULES
The FCC adopted the fin-syn rules in 1970 in an
effort to limit the power of ABC, NBC and CBS
over television programming.' The 1970 Order pro-
hibited the networks from syndicating programs they
had produced "in-house" and from obtaining finan-
cial interests in programs produced by outside pro-
ducers that the networks aired.' The FCC asserted
two primary reasons for adopting the fin-syn rules.
First, the Commission believed that the networks
had "monopsony" power, or the ability to acquire
programming rights under terms distinctly unfavora-
ble to producers." This monopsony power arose, ac-
cording to the Commission, because the networks
were the only program providers that could access
virtually every American household.' Thus, if pro-
ducers wanted to have their programs shown, they
had little choice but to comply with the networks'
terms. Second, the Commission asserted that without
the fin-syn rules, the networks would prevent inde-
pendent stations from being able to purchase and/or
show popular programs by withholding, or ware-
housing, those programs or by granting favorable
syndication rights to their network affiliates.' This
second argument refers to the claim that the net-
works have, and will exercise, monopoly power.
These practices would have further increased the
networks' dominance in the television programming
F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1971).
3 1970 Order, supra note 2, para. 30.
I d. para. 8.
Id.
o Id. para. 12; see also Suzanne Rosencrans, The Questiona-
ble Validity of the Network Syndication and Financial Interest
Rules in the Present Media Environment, 43 FED. COM. L.J.
65, 66-67 (1990).
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marketplace at a time when cable television barely
existed and VCRs were still virtually unknown. The
problem with the networks obtaining greater domi-
nance, as the FCC saw it, was that the networks
would not only exercise monopsony power over pro-
ducers, but also would have a virtual monopoly over
the programs that Americans watched.7 This would
have the effect of limiting the number and variety of
programs available to the public, thereby limiting
program diversity, contrary to the FCC's much
sought after goal.
The Commission reaffirmed its intent to promote
program diversity in 1993' by asserting:
[Tihe Commission has the authority to regulate the net-
works in accordance with the public interest, convenience
or necessity and, thus, has the authority to restrict net-
work programming activities so as to foster diversity of
programming sources and outlets that might result in a
greater variety of programming than the free market.
would provide.9
Consequently, the Commission structured the fin-syn
rules to promote diversity in three different, yet in-
terrelated, ways - source diversity, outlet diversity
and program diversity. Source diversity measures the
number of program originators, or producers, in-
volved in supplying television programs; outlet diver-
sity measures the number of different means of com-
munications available to the public, such as network
television, cable television, and VCRs; and program
diversity measures the different types of programs
offered to viewers.' 0
In 1977, the Commission established an array of
experts, the Network Inquiry Special Staff
("NISS"), to evaluate how the marketplace for pro-
ducing programs had changed over the past seven
years. The FCC also requested the NISS to deter-
mine the effect the 1970 Order had on networks and
producers. Based on an extensive two-year study un-
dertaken by the NISS, the Commission released a
Tentative Decision in 1983, proposing to eliminate
7 From 1957 through 1968, the percentage of prime time
network programming provided by independent producers de-
clined to nearly 4% from 33%. Also during this time, the net-
works controlled program production both through their own
production activities as well as through co-production arrange-
ments, in which independent companies produced the programs
and then sold first-run rights as well as syndication rights to the
networks. DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG ET AL., REGULATION OF THE
ELECTRONIC MASS MEDIA 266 (2d ed. 1991).
' In re Evaluation of the Syndication and Financial Interest
Rules, Second Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd 3282 (1993)
[hereinafter 1993 Order].
9 Id. para. 5.
10 Id. para. 42 (citing Tentative Decision and Request for
the financial interest rule entirely, and to signifi-
cantly narrow the syndication rule." If the Tentative
Decision had taken effect, the only remaining restric-
tions on the networks would have been a prohibition
against domestic syndication of prime time program-
ming and a prohibition against warehousing.
12
The Commission concluded in the Tentative Deci-
sion that the fin-syn rules should be relaxed based on
the NISS' finding that the networks no longer had
the ability to control the price or conditions under
which producers would sell their programs. The
Commission reasoned that:
In order for these concerns to be realized, two conditions
regarding network behavior must be met. First, the three
networks must be able to act in concert, either tacitly (by
parallel behavior) or collusively (by active conspiracy).
Second, the three networks together must comprise the
sole purchasers of the program producers' product. If ei-
ther of these conditions is not met, it is not likely that the
networks could exert power over program producers. This
is so because, if adequate alternative program purchasers
exist, any producer who may be dissatisfied with the
treatment he receives by a single broadcast network has
the option of offering his product to a different network or
some other program purchaser."
Neither of these conditions existed. Instead, the
Commission discovered that the networks did in fact
compete with one another. The Commission also
found that the number of program purchasers had
increased due to an increased demand for new pro-
gramming, which increase was caused by an expan-
sion in the number of broadcast outlets.' 4 Further-
more, the Commission "found no credible evidence
that the rules have fostered the development of first-
run syndicated programming or have increased the
diversity or competitiveness of the program supply
market..'.
The Tentative Decision barely had time to be
printed before a powerful lobbying battle arose in
Congress with the networks on one side and
Hollywood actors, producers and directors on the
Further Comments in Docket 82-345, 94 F.C.C.2d 1019, para.
104 (1983) [hereinafter Tentative Decision]).
1 Tentative Decision, supra note 10, paras. 10-14.
12 Id.
Ia d. para. 124.
14 Id. para. 125.
' Id. para. 195; see also In re Evaluation of the Syndication
and Financial Interest Rules, Report and Order, 6 FCC Rcd
3094, 3171 (1991) (Sikes, A., dissenting) [hereinafter 1991 Or-
der]. For a descriptive look at the irony of the FCC's attempt to
promote diversity through the 1991 Order, see Warren G. La-
vey, Inconsistencies in Applications of Economics at the Federal




other.'" The Commission never adopted the Tenta-
tive Decision. Instead, Congress entered the battle on
the side of Hollywood, and along with the Commis-
sion, encouraged Hollywood and the networks to ne-
gotiate a compromise."7 The two sides never did
enter into a compromise, and in 1990, Fox petitioned
the FCC for a waiver of the fin-syn rules.18 Fox ar-
gued that the rule defining a network was overly
broad and had the effect of restraining new networks
such as itself from adequately competing with the es-
tablished networks. 9 The rules in effect in 1990 de-
fined a network as "any person, entity or corporation
which offers an interconnected program service on a
regular basis for 15 or more hours per week to at
least 25 affiliated television licensees in 10 or more
states." 20 Fox, which had launched its network in
1986, now had 129 affiliates and would soon exceed
the fifteen-hour programming limit. 2 By subjecting
emerging networks to the fin-syn rules, Fox argued,
the Commission was in effect causing more harm to
diversity than good because the rules discouraged
emerging networks from programming to their full
capacity. Emerging networks' refusal to program at
full capacity limited the number of outlets to whom
producers could sell their programs, all the while
giving the traditional three networks an even greater
concentration of power.
22
The Commission used the Fox Petition as an op-
portunity to review the fin-syn rules, once again, in
light of the changes that had occurred in the market-
place since the FCC first adopted the rules in 1970.
In the review, the Commission found:
- The number of independent television stations
had increased from 65 in 1970 to nearly 340 in
1990, and 130 independent stations obtained a
significant portion of their programming from
Fox;
- Programming services originating on cable had
grown substantially, with over 90 national pro-
16 See, e.g., Michael R. Gardner, Commentary: December
19, 1984 - A Big Day in Telecommunications, 34 CATH. U. L.
REv. 625, 627-28 (1985).
1 GINSBURG, supra note 7, at 277.
16 Fox Broadcasting Company Petition for Resumption of
Rulemaking and Request for Temporary Relief in Amendment
of the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, BC Docket 82-
345 (Jan. 30, 1990) [hereinafter Fox Petition] (on file with the
FCC).
19 Id. at 39.
* 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(j)(ii)(4) (1990).
*i Fox Petition, supra note 18, at 6.
32 Id. at 39. Indeed, as the Commission later discovered, the
fin-syn rules had precisely this effect. Fox reduced the number
of hours of programming it supplied to affiliates specifically to
gramming services available in 1990;
- Almost sixty percent (60%) of all American tel-
evision households subscribed to cable services;
and
- The networks' aggregate share of the nation-
wide prime time viewing audience had declined
from approximately ninety percent (90%) in
1970 to nearly sixty-two percent (62%) in
1990.28
Despite this increase in the number of "alternative
video outlets," the Commission remained uncon-
vinced that the networks were no longer in a position
to extract programming rights under terms distinctly
unfavorable to producers. Nor was the Commission
convinced that these new sources of competition
would effectively restrain the networks from favoring
their own affiliates with syndication rights to the
most popular programs. Thus, while acknowledging
that the video marketplace had changed substantially
in the past twenty years, and that the three tradi-
tional networks no longer possessed the power they
once had, which lead the Commission to adopt the
fin-syn rules originally, the FCC nonetheless re-
tained significant restrictions on the networks.24 As
for Fox's waiver request, the FCC "grandfathered"
the new fin-syn rules for any financial interest and
syndication rights obtained by an emerging network
prior to meeting the newly-established definition of a
network. 2' However, for any future programs, the
new networks had to comply with the rules immedi-
ately upon becoming a network.26
II. THE SCHURZ COURT'S REMAND OF
THE 1991 ORDER AND THE FCC'S
RESPONSE
The fin-syn rules reached the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals in October 1992, when the net-
works petitioned the court to invalidate the 1991 Or-
avoid being classified as a network and thereby become subject to
the financial interest and syndication restraints. See 1993 Order,
supra note 8, para. 104.
* 1991 Order, supra note 15, para. 36 (citations omitted).
, The FCC also redefined "network" to mean "any entity
providing more than 15 hours per week of prime time program-
ming on a regular basis to interconnected affiliates that reach, in
aggregate, at least 75 percent of television households nation-
wide." 1991 Order, supra note 15, para. 145; see also 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.658(j)(4) (1993). The Commission defined "regular basis"
as "exceeding the specified number of hours per week on an av-
erage basis during the preceding six months of operation." 1991
Order, supra note 15, para. 156.




der.27 The networks argued that the Commission
had failed to justify its decisions in the 1991 Order
in light of arguments raised by commenters, and that
the 1991 Order was therefore unenforceable.2 8 Judge
Posner, writing for the court, agreed. Judge Posner
concluded that the 1991 Order, "despite its length, is
unreasoned and unreasonable, and therefore, in the
jargon of judicial review of administrative action, ar-
bitrary and capricious."29
The information that the Commission relied on in
1991 when deciding to reexamine the twenty-year-
old rules included: (i) the results of the NISS study,
which concluded that the fin-syn rules had failed to
achieve the Commission's goals of diversity and in-
creased competition in the program supply market;80
(ii) the Justice Department's and the Federal Trade
Commission's remarks that they had not seen any
evidence that the networks were in a position to ex-
ploit their alleged market power either with or with-
out the rules;"' and (iii) the FCC Chairman's own
conclusion that "[t]he video marketplace of 1991
bears not even a superficial resemblance to the video
marketplace that existed when the rules were origi-
nally adopted."'8 2 Judge Posner described the 1991
Order best when he said:
It can be paraphrased as follows. The television industry
has changed since 1970. There is more competition-cable
television, the new network, etc. No longer is it clear that
the networks have market power in an antitrust sense,
which they could use to whipsaw the independent produc-
ers and strangle the independent stations. So there should
be some "deregulation" of programming-some movement
away from the 1970 rules. But not too much, because even
in their decline the networks may retain some power to
extort programs or program rights from producers....
[T]he Commission's concern . . . is not just with market
power in an antitrust sense but with diversity, and diver-
sity is promoted by measures to assure a critical mass of
outside producers and independent stations. . . .The new
rules will give the networks a greater opportunity to par-
ticipate in programming than the old ones did, while pro-
" Schurz Communications v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043 (7th Cir.
1992).
I d. at 1048-49. Coalitions of producers and independent
stations also filed petitions for review, arguing that the Commis-
sion should have left the original rules (i.e., the 1970 Order)
intact. Id.
I, d. at 1055.
80 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, NEW TELEVI-
SION NETWORKS: ENTRY, JURISDICTION, OWNERSHIP AND
REGULATION, Vol. II at 808-09 (1980).
"' Comments of the U.S. Department of Justice in Evalua-
tion of the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, MM
Docket No. 90-162, at 29 (June 14, 1990) [hereinafter DOJ
Comments] (on file with the FCC).
8' 1991 Order, supra note 15, at 3175 (Sikes, A., dissenting).
tecting outside producers and independent stations from
too much network competition. 8
The court's description parallels that of Henry
Geller, who served as General Counsel for the FCC
in 1970 when the FCC initially enacted the fin-syn
rules. Geller described the process leading to the
1970 Order as being a lot like Alice in Wonderland -
- "Sentence first, judgment later.""4
Although the Communications Act of 1934 (the
"Communications Act") grants the FCC considera-
ble discretion in deciding telecommunications issues,
that discretion does know certain limitations." Both
the Administrative Procedure Act and the Communi-
cations Act require the FCC to engage in reasoned
decisionmaking. Consequently, the FCC cannot sim-
ply announce its conclusion without first providing a
reasoned basis supporting that conclusion. 6 The
Schurz court concluded that the FCC had failed sub-
stantially in measuring up to this standard with the
1991 Order. The court held that the Commission
had failed to articulate its reasons for concluding
that the restrictions on network participation in pro-
gramming were necessary to promote diversity."7
Consequently, the court vacated the 1991 Order and
remanded it to the Commission for further
proceedings."8
As particular instances of where the Commission
failed to respond to facts and issues raised in the
course of adopting the 1991 Order, the court pointed
to several arguments asserted by the networks. For
example, despite the FCC's claim that the new rules
deregulated the fin-syn rules in substantial respects,
the networks argued that the new rules did not in
fact increase their access to the programming market,
and may have even decreased their access.3" The net-
works also argued that the forty percent limit on the
amount of prime time entertainment programming
that they could provide from in-house productions
was a new restriction that had no counterpart in the
88 Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1050.
Telephone Interview with Henry Geller, former FCC
General Counsel (Oct. 19, 1993).
88 Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C.
§ 151, et seq. (1994).
88 See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union v. FCC, 823
F.2d 1554, 1581 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that the Commission
must respond to all significant points raised in the record be-
cause otherwise the opportunity to comment, which is at the
foundation of the rulemaking process, is rendered meaningless).
,' Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1054-55.
Id. at 1055.
89 Id. at 1050-51 (noting that "[tihese arguments might be




original rules."0 In addition, the court noted that
"carving out" nonentertainment programs from the
restrictions imposed by the new rules is a throwaway
because there is no syndication market for news and
sports programs."1 The networks further argued that
their newly-granted privilege to acquire syndication
rights from outside producers was illusory because
the fin-syn rules required a thirty-day "cooling off"
period following the date on which the outside pro-
ducer and the network reached an agreement on net-
work license fees that the network could charge for
the sale of syndiccation rights in a given program
and the date on which the networks could begin ne-
gotiating the sale of those rights. The networks as-
serted that the cooling off period actually harmed
outside producers because producers must rely on the
immediate sale of syndication rights if they are to
have enough money to produce the program in the
first place.4
2
The FCC responded to the court's remand in
Schurz by issuing a Second Report and Order in
1993."8 In the 1993 Order, the Commission high-
lighted, clarified, and in some instances modified, the
fin-syn rules to specifically address five points that
the court had made. The points included: 1) Net-
work Acquisition of Back-End Rights; 2) Network
Syndication of Off-Network Programming; 3) Net-
work Participation in the First-Run Programming
Market; 4) Entities that Qualify as a Network; and
5) Reporting Requirements Imposed on Networks.""
A. Network Acquisition of Back-End Rights
The 1991 Order created a two-step process
through which the networks could acquire financial
interests or syndication rights in outside productions
aired on their respective networks. Under the 1991
Order, a network would first execute a licensing
agreement with the outside producer, establishing
the amount the network would pay the producer for
the right to air the program. Then, after no less than
thirty days, the network could enter into entirely
separate negotiations with the producer for the right
to acquire a financial interest in the program."' Ac-
quiring a financial interest in a program enables a
40 Id.
"' Id. at 1051.
Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1050-51; see also infra, discussion at
Part H.A.
43 1993 Order, supra note 8, paras. 6-10.
44 Id.
4 1991 Order, supra note 15, para. 49.
46 The networks typically air a program twice, then sell the
network to sell the rights to reruns of that
program.' 6
The two-step process was premised on a theory
that separating the license fee agreement from the fi-
nancial interest negotiations would protect producers
from the networks' exploitation of their power over
the marketplace.'7 The Commission noted that "[a]
network that has not committed to license a program
could . . . condition its commitment on a producer's
agreement to relinquish financial interests or distri-
bution rights in the program for less than a compen-
satory price."' 8 According to the Commission, this
harms the public interest because the less-than-com-
pensatory price paid for programs will discourage
independent producers from creating programs, and
thereby decrease program diversity by limiting the
number of sources that will remain willing or able to
supply programming.
49
The Schurz court pointed out that this two-step
negotiation process actually disserved the Commis-
sion's stated goals of competition and diversity be-
cause smaller producers would be unable to afford
the cost of producing a program without financial
backing, and thus would be forced out of business.60
This would decrease the number of producers able to
supply television programming to the networks. As
ABC explained, "producers 'must explore "deficit"
financing options' long before a network license fee
agreement is signed, because the availability, size
and terms of that financing will determine the pro-
gram budget the producer can afford and the deficit
he or she can realistically accept."'" However, the
1991 Order prohibited the networks from providing
such financing because the networks were unable to
pay for anything more than the right to air the pro-
gram on the network until thirty days after the net-
work and producer entered into a licensing agree-
ment. As indicated previously, this was often too late
for small, independent producers who needed fund-
ing prior to creating a program in order to be able to
hire actors and directors.
Networks often are in the best position to bear the
risk that a program will not be one of the select few
that becomes a "smash hit"- typically a necessary
prelude to syndication. 2 By prohibiting the networks
right to air reruns of the program to other stations - usually
independent stations or cable networks.
47 Id., paras. 48-49.
46 1991 Order, supra note 15, para. 50.
I, d., para. 23, n.23.
60 Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1051-52.
61 1993 Order, supra note 8, para. 36.
" Before a program can enter syndication, the program usu-
1995]
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from helping finance programs, the 1991 Order
eliminated three major sources of financing for pro-
ducers. This caused the greatest harm to small, inde-
pendent producers who had to seek financing else-
where - often in the hands of larger production
companies or in bankruptcy proceedings. Thus, the
large production companies would continue to grow
larger, while the small production companies or in-
dependent producers would become virtually
nonexistent."
In the 1993 Order, the Commission acknowledged
that the networks had experienced a decline in net-
work share, which was attributable primarily to the
"emergence of other viewing options," including the
Fox network, independent television stations and
cable television networks."' These alternative view-
ing options presented additional sources of diversity
for viewers as well as more market opportunities for
program producers. 5 As a result, the traditional
three networks could no longer be said to hold mo-
nopsony power over the programs available to view-
ers, which was the original rationale behind the fin-
syn rules. Consequently, the Commission eliminated
the restrictions on the networks' ability to acquire fi-
nancial interests and syndication rights in network
programming.
56
ally must have aired on a network for at least four years. When
off-network stations purchase the rights to air a program, they
typically air daily, rather than weekly, episodes as the networks
do. Without a large number of episodes, the off-network stations
have an insufficient number of programs to fill their schedules.
Providing enough episodes can often be difficult, because nearly
80% of prime time network programs fail before their third year.
Brief for Federal Communications Commission in Schurz Com-
munications, Inc. v. FCC, Docket No. 91-2350, at 5 (June 12,
1992) (on file with the FCC).
53 CBS noted that:
[t]elevision production and distribution companies that
have declared bankruptcy or been absorbed by larger com-
panies in the last few years include Orion, Fries En-
tertainment Inc., New World Entertainment, Studio
Three Film Corp., Orbis Communications, CBS Commu-
nications, Blair Entertainment, and Hanna-Barbera ...
In addition, MGM and Imagine Films have both aban-
doned television production.
Comments of CBS Inc. in Response to Second Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking in MM Docket No. 90-162 at 13, n.39
(Feb. 1, 1993)(citations omitted) [hereinafter CBS Comments]
(on file with the FCC).
In- May 1994, New World Communications Group ("New
World") and News Corp.'s Fox sent a wake-up call to ABC,
NBC and CBS by announcing an affiliation agreement under
which New World's twelve current or soon to be owned VHF
network affiliates would become Fox affiliates for the next ten
years. In exchange, Fox guaranteed New World time on Fox-
B. Network Syndication of Off-Network
Programming
The 1991 Order permitted the networks to ac-
tively syndicate, within the United States, forty per-
cent of their prime time entertainment shows, as well
as any non-entertainment and non-prime time pro-
gramming, that the networks produced in-house and
aired on their own network. Networks could also
acquire syndication rights in off-network program-
ming produced by someone other than the network
as long as the networks used an independent syn-
dicator to distribute the programs.5 8 In foreign mar-
kets, the networks could acquire syndication rights
in, and actively syndicate, all off-network program-
ming aired on any network, regardless of whether
the programs were produced in-house or by an
outside producer.59
The Commission believed these restrictions were
necessary to prevent the networks from warehousing
programs in which they held syndication rights. The
Commission reasoned that the networks would with-
hold certain syndicated programs from distribution
in order to increase the price independent stations
would be forced to pay for the right to air the pro-
grams.60 However, when the warehousing theory
proved untrue, the Commission developed a second
theory. Under the second theory, networks could un-
owned stations for New World programming. Geoffrey Foisie,
Fox and the New World Order, BROADCASTING & CABLE,
May 30, 1994, at 6. The Fox-New World agreement upset CBS
the most because CBS had to locate new affiliates in eight mar-
kets as a result of former affiliates switching to Fox pursuant to
the Fox-New World agreement. Fox also secured additional af-
filiates and receivers of Fox programming in March 1994, upon
acquiring rights to the National Football Conference games.
Steve McClellan, Fox Snaps Up Other Networks' Affiliates,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Mar. 28, 1994, at 12.
5, 1993 Order, supra note 8, para. 45. The number of inde-
pendent stations more than doubled between 1980 and 1992,
with 129 stations in 1980 and 380 stations in 1992. Likewise,
the number of cable networks grew substantially, from 34 in
1982 to 80 in 1992, and 100 in 1993. Id.
"' "Between 1985 and 1991, 58% of the producers that sup-
plied one or more prime time entertainment series program to
the networks also supplied programs to Fox, cable and/or first-
run syndication." Id., n.50.
" Id. para. 55.
57 1991 Order, supra note 15, para. 108. The 1991 Order
defined "in-house productions" as "those network programs
which are: (1) solely produced by the network; (2) co-produced
by the network with foreign production entities; or (3) co-pro-
duced by the network with outside domestic production entities
that initiate such arrangements." Id., para. 56.
Is d. para. 114.
I d. para. 125.
60 See Tentative Decision, supra note 10, para. 199.
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reasonably delay the commencement of syndication
of a few popular, current network programs, thereby
keeping the viewers tuned in to the networks and
limiting the amount of competition the 'networks
would encounter from independent stations. 1 Delay-
ing the release of popular programs would harm
outlet diversity by limiting independent stations'
ability to compete effectively in their local broadcast
markets. This inability to compete would arise from
independent stations' preclusion from showing some
of the most popular programs, which in turn would
cause more viewers to turn to network programs
rather than to programs aired on independent sta-
tions. Advertising revenue for independent stations
would relatedly decrease, thereby limiting indepen-
dent stations' ability to purchase popular programs.
Consequently, the gap between networks and inde-
pendent stations would increase even further.
As a result of this warehousing concern, the 1991
Order required the networks to release into syndica-
tion any program for which they held syndication
rights either: (i) four years after the program's net-
work debut; or (ii) within six months following the
date on which the network discontinued airing the
program, whichever occurred first.62 The FCC also
required the networks to make syndicated off-net-
work programming available to any non-affiliated
station on terms and conditions no less favorable
than those offered to affiliates or owned-and-oper-
ated stations.6  The FCC automatically presumed
favoritism if a network syndicated programming to
affiliates or owned-and-operated stations in more
than thirty percent of the markets where the network
sold programming rights.64 Those who opposed the
networks' ability to acquire syndication rights ar-
gued that warehousing or "affiliate favoritism prac-
tices" limit the number of programs available to in-
dependent stations, thereby inflating the cost of
syndicated programs and threatening the viability of
independent stations."
The Schurz court noted that the "safeguards"
61 1993 Order, supra note 8, paras. 75-79.
e See 47 C.F.R. § 73.660(b) (1993).
OS 1991 Order, supra note 15, para. 110.
See 47'C.F.R. § 73.660(b) (1992).
6 1991 Order, supra note 15, paras. 83-84.
68 Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1045.
6 See Brief for Petitioner National Broadcasting Co., Inc. in
Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, Docket No. 91-2350, at
37 (Aug. 13, 1992) [hereinafter NBC Appellate Brief] (on file
with the FCC); see also Comments of Action for Children's Tel-
evision, Henry Geller and Donna Lampert in Evaluation of the
Financial Interest and Syndication Rules, MM Docket No. 90-
162, at 12 (June 14, 1990) (on file with the FCC); 1991 Order,
against warehousing and affiliate favoritism were fu-
tile because:
If the networks insisted on buying syndication rights along
with the right to exhibit a program on the network itself,
they would be paying more for their programming....
If the networks then turned around and refused to syndi-
cate independent stations, they would be getting nothing
in return for the money they had laid out for syndication
rights except a long-shot chance - incidentally, illegal
under the antitrust laws - to weaken the already weak
competitors of networks stations."
Likewise, the networks and those in favor of repeal-
ing the fin-syn rules argued that in order for the net-
works to even be able to warehouse programs, the
networks would have to acquire syndication rights to
nearly all, if not in fact all, of the program series
they air.6" Unless the networks were able to acquire
syndication rights to all or nearly all programs, inde-
pendent stations could simply bypass the networks
by purchasing programs from other sources.
Even if the networks were financially capable of
acquiring syndication rights to all of the programs
they aired, the networks would do themselves more
harm than good by warehousing programs. The net-
works would receive a much lower price for a pro-
gram by waiting to sell program rights until some
time after the network no longer aired the program.
Likewise, some statistics show that reruns can actu-
ally increase the ratings of original network pro-
grams.6" The amount of competition that the net-
works would allegedly avoid by warehousing
programs could in no way come close, in terms of
dollars and cents, to equaling the amount of money
the networks would receive upon selling program
rights. As if this were not enough, the networks
would also have to start from ground zero in with-
holding programs because between 1970 and 1991,
the networks were prohibited from acquiring syndi-
cation rights in programs, the necessary precursor to
distributing programs. To make matters even more
difficult, antitrust laws prohibit warehousing." Con-
supra note 15, at 3196 (Sikes, A., dissenting).
6' For example, Cheers became available for syndication in
1987, was the top-ranked program for the 1990-91 season, and
in 1993, still ranked consistently among the top ten. Addition-
ally, Roseanne and Murphy Brown, which both entered syndi-
cation in the fall of 1992, ranked second and third, respectively,
for the season, behind 60 Minutes. Full House entered syndica-
tion in 1991, and ranked eighth for the season. Reply Comments
of CBS Inc. in Evaluation of the Syndication and Financial In-
terest Rules, MM Docket No. 90-162, at 15, n.61 (Feb. 16,
1993) [hereinafter CBS Reply Comments] (on file with the
FCC).
69 See Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1046.
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sequently, if any network employed this tactic with
even one program, the Justice Department, as well
as the FCC, would be ready to respond in kind with
restrictions likely never to be lifted.
Despite acknowledging that the networks no
longer possessed monopoly power over the video
marketplace, in 1993 the Commission nonetheless
retained the anti-warehousing rule 70 and prohibited
the networks from actively syndicating any off-net-
work programming, including in-house produc-
tions.7 1 The Commission based the remaining re-
strictions on "three critical non-market factors":
(1) the impossibility of being certain that lifting fin-syn
constraints would cause no harm, (2) the more significant
risk of damage to outlet diversity in the event we improvi-
dently removed the remaining restrictions, and (3) the
danger that immediate elimination of all the rules would
be disruptive and have unintended and unforeseen
effects. 2
Therefore, the networks must use an independent
syndicator for both in-house and outside productions
if they wish to distribute off-network programming
in which they own syndication rights. Networks may
still acquire foreign syndication rights in off-network
programming and may actively syndicate those pro-
grams.7 ' The FCC also repealed the affiliate favorit-
ism restraints, finding the restraints unnecessary
given the newly-enacted rule prohibiting networks
from actively syndicating off-network programming
within the United States.
7 4
C. Network Participation in the First-Run Pro-
gramming Market
The 1993 Order does not restrict networks from
acquiring financial interests or syndication rights in
domestic first-run syndication programs produced
solely in-house." Networks may also acquire finan-
70 47 C.F.R. § 73.660(c) (1993).
71 1993 Order, supra note 8, para. 67.
72 In re Evaluation of the Syndication and Financial Interest
Rules, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 8 FCC Rcd 8270,
para. 44 (1993) [hereinafter October MO&O], Erratum to Eval-
uation of the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, 8 FCC
Rcd 8416 (1993); see also 1993 Order, supra note 8, paras. 73-
74.
73 1993 Order, supra note 8, para. 67, n.85.
I Id. para. 81.
7 "First-run" programs are those that producers intend to
be distributed directly to stations without first airing on a net-
work. Examples of first-run programs include Jeopardy, En-
tertainment Tonight and Oprah Winfrey. See, e.g., 1991 Order,
supra note 15, para. 137.
7e 1993 Order, supra note 8, para. 88. The Commission con-
cial interests and syndication rights in any first-run
syndication programs that are distributed entirely
outside of the United States.76 Although the net-
works may acquire financial interests and syndica-
tion rights in programs produced in-house, their dis-
tribution of these programs into domestic syndication
is limited to passive syndication - for example, us-
ing an independent syndicator to distribute the pro-
grams. In foreign markets, the networks may actively
syndicate (or distribute themselves) any first-run
programming.77  These rules simply copy those
adopted in 1991.
In response to the Schurz court's concern that the
1991 first-run syndication rules were inconsistent
with the Commission's 1983 Tentative Decision, the
FCC argued that the Tentative Decision did not spe-
cifically address first-run programming.78 The Com-
mission also stated that the continuing restrictions
were necessary to ensure that the networks would
not be able to control the program distribution mar-
ket and thereby drive independent stations out of
business. 9 In concluding that the networks could
harm independent stations' vitality if they were to
actively syndicate first-run programming, the Com-
mission agreed with assertions made by the Associa-
tion of Independent Television Stations ("INTV")
that the networks would favor their own affiliate sta-
tions if they were permitted to actively syndicate
programs. 0 Examples of how INTV believed the
networks would favor their affiliates included fun-
neling the networks' most attractive syndicated pro-
gramming to their affiliates, favoring the bids of
their own affiliates, providing advance notification to
affiliates, block booking, instituting affiliate program
tie-ins, implementing discriminatory pricing, and ex-
ploiting their owned and affiliated stations to handi-
cap the launch of new first-run programs by inde-
pendent syndicators."1
cluded that the syndication restraints were unnecessary in for-
eign markets because the networks did not have any affiliates
outside the United States through which they could engage in
warehousing or affiliate favoritism practices. Id. para. 96. The
Commission concluded in 1991 that the revenue networks would
receive from foreign syndication could be used to provide more
diverse and creative programming within the United States. See
1991 Order, supra note 15, para. 128.
77 1993 Order, supra note 8, para. 93.
78 Id. para. 97.
"' Id. paras. 97-98. The Tentative Decision would have lim-
ited any syndication restraints to the distribution of prime time
entertainment programming. Tentative Decision, supra note 10,
para. 202.
" 1993 Order, supra note 8, paras. 80-82.
"1 NBC Appellate Brief, supra note 67, at 36.
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In addition to affiliate favoritism concerns, the
Commission reasoned that the very nature of first-
run programs makes it easier for the networks to
gain an advantage over independent stations.
[Tihe success of a program produced for the first-run
market is contingent first, on clearances by the most pow-
erful stations in the top few markets, and, second, on
clearances in a large number of markets throughout the
country. The first step is a prerequisite to the second, and
the major networks are uniquely positioned - because
they own powerful stations in virtually every major net-
work and have significant influence over a web of affili-
ates serving the entire United States - to achieve both
steps in much more expeditious and efficient fashion than
any other competitor.8
D. The Definition of a Network
The 1991 Order defined a television network as
"cany person, entity, or corporation providing on a
regular basis more than fifteen (15) hours of prime
time programming per week (exclusive of live cover-
age of bona fide news events of national importance)
to interconnected affiliates that reach, in aggregate,
at least seventy-five (75) percent of television house-
holds nationwide. . . ."8 At the time of the 1991
Order, Fox was supplying twelve to fourteen hours
of prime time programming per week to its owned
and affiliated stations, after cutting back from fifteen
hours to avoid becoming subject to the fin-syn rules.
Henry Geller declared that Fox's situation demon-
strates the "absurdity of this whole thing," 4 because
in order for Fox to remain profitable, Fox had to
11 1993 Order, supra note 8, para. 89. ABC, NBC and CBS
are not unique in their position of owning stations in the top
three markets (New York, Chicago and Los Angeles) as well as
having nationwide household penetration. Warner Brothers, for
example, in establishing the WB Network uses the Tribune
broadcasting stations, other than WGN in Chicago, as network
affiliates. Tribune owns stations in New York, Los Angeles,
Philadelphia, Atlanta and New Orleans. Joe Flint, Warner De-
tails Hybrid WB Network, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Nov. 8,
1993, at 26. Tribune also has 20.7% household penetration,
compared to CBS and NBC, which had 20.5% and 22.1%, re-
spectively, in 1990. BROADCASTING & CABLE, Nov. 8, 1993, at
43; see also NBC Appellate Brief, supra note 67, at 40.
8 47 C.F.R. § 73.662(i) (1991); see also 1991 Order, supra
note 15, para. 156.
8, Telephone Interview with Henry Geller, former FCC
General Counsel (Oct. 19, 1993).
86 The major networks' owned and affiliated stations, on the
other hand, operate primarily in the VHF band, which provides
them with a technological advantage over UHF stations. See Oc-
tober MO&O, supra note 72, para. 77. However, Fox removed
some of the advantage traditionally held by ABC, NBC and
program less than fifteen hours, which naturally lim-
its the diversity of programming available to viewers
as well as the number of sources to whom producers
will be able to sell their programs. The Schurz court
agreed, pointing out that many Fox affiliates are tra-
ditionally weak UHF85 stations who are more like
independent stations than network affiliates.8" "Any-
thing that weakens Fox's incentives to furnish
prime-time programming weakens [the stations],
contrary to the Commission's desire . . . to
strengthen independent stations."8
The Schurz court commanded the FCC to recon-
sider, or at the very least provide a reasoned basis
for, the Commission's decision to subject Fox to the
fin-syn rules. On reconsideration, the Commission
chose to retain the same network definition but to
exempt "emerging networks" from most of the fin-
syn rules.88 An "emerging network" is any entity
which did not qualify as a network under the Com-
mission's 1991 rules at the time the 1993 Order be-
came effective, even if that network later meets the
criteria defining a network. Therefore, any entity
that did not provide more than fifteen hours of prime
time programming per week as of June 5, 1993,
when the 1993 Order became effective, will not be-
come subject to the financial interest and syndication
restraints.89
The Commission declared that exempting emerg-
ing networks from the rules, rather than redefining
the term network, made more sense because the 1993
Order prescribed that the fin-syn rules will expire
two years after a California district court modifies
the network consent decrees.9" The Commission fur-
CBS when it reached an agreement with New World, pursuant
to which Fox would broadcast programs on New World's twelve
VHF affiliates. See Foisie, supra note 53.
" Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1053.
87 Id.
88 1993 Order, supra note 8, para. 99. Any network that
provides in excess of 15 hours of prime time programming per
week still remains subject to the Commission's reporting re-
quirements described infra at Part II.E. Id.
89 1993 Order, supra note 8, paras. 99, 120.
90 Id. para. 105. These consent decrees were originally en-
tered into in 1978 and 1980 between ABC, NBC, CBS and the
Justice Department, and prohibited the three networks from ac-
quiring any interests other than network exhibition rights in
programs produced by outside suppliers and from engaging in
any syndication whatsoever. See United States v. National
Broadcasting Co., Inc., 449 F.Supp. 1127 (C.D. Cal. 1978),
afl'd, 603 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991
(1979); see also United States v. American Broadcasting Co.,
Inc., 45 Fed. Reg. 58,442 (1980); United States v. CBS, Inc., 45
Fed. Reg. 34,464 (1980).
ABC, NBC and CBS filed a joint motion with the United
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ther concluded that exempting Fox and any other
emerging networks best served the Commission's
goals of enhancing competition and promoting diver-
sity because this would allow emerging networks to
devote their resources to acquiring more and higher
quality programs. Emerging networks could then
display these programs on their affiliate stations to
increase the number of viewers who tune in to the
network. Competition and diversity would be en-
hanced by the ability of emerging networks to supply
independent stations with programming they might
not otherwise be able to afford, and which is essen-
tial to independent stations' survival. 1
E. Reporting Requirements
As a way of monitoring networks' compliance
with the fin-syn rules, as well as the networks reac-
tion to the lifted financial interest and syndication
restraints, the FCC implemented certain reporting
requirements. In contrast to the remaining fin-syn
rules, all networks, emerging or otherwise, that pro-
vide more than fifteen hours of prime time program-
ming per week to interconnected affiliates must com-
ply with the reporting requirements."
The reporting requirements instruct networks to
place reports in their owned and operated stations'
public files before the first regular business day of
March and September of each year, and to submit a
copy of the reports to the FCC by the same dates."'
These reports must: 1) certify compliance with all
remaining fin-syn rules; 2) list all network prime
time entertainment programs and all first-run non-
network programs in which the network holds or ac-
quires a financial interest or syndication right, in-
cluding the name of the program, whether the pro-
gram was a network or first-run program, the nature
of the interest or right held in the program, the dates
any network program began and ended its network
run, and the date any first-run program first ap-
States District Court for the Central District of California (the
"District Court") following the Commission's 1991 Order, re-
questing that the decrees be modified to allow the networks to
acquire financial interests and syndication rights in program-
ming, at least consistent with the 1991 Order. On November 9,
1993, the District Court granted the networks' motion. See
United States v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 842 F. Supp.
402 (C.D. Cal. 1993). Thus, the fin-syn rules are set to expire
on November 15, 1995, unless those in favor of retaining the fin-
syn rules can convince the Commission that the rules are still
necessary under the Commission's final review of the rules,
which the Commission initiated in April 1995. See 1993 Order,
supra note 8, para. 191; see also Review of the Syndication and
Financial Interest Rules, Notice of Proposed Rule Making in
peared in syndication; and 3) the party who initiated
negotiations that led to the network's acquisition of a
financial interest or syndication right in programs
acquired prior to June 5, 1993, which are presented
to the public.9
Additionally, networks must maintain a "customer
list," which records sales to broadcast stations of any
prime time entertainment program or any first-run
non-network program that the network actively syn-
dicates.95 When networks sell programs to foreign
broadcast stations, the network may either redact the
identity of the foreign stations (if the network pro-
vides contracts as part of its report required by Sec-
tion 73.661 of the Commission's rules) or list only
the city and country of the station to which the pro-
gram is syndicated.96 The Commission allowed net-
works to exclude the actual identity of foreign sta-
tions so as to protect the networks from having to
disclose sensitive proprietary information.
97
III. THE FIN-SYN RULES' FUTURE
Networks, syndicators, producers and independent
television stations each petitioned the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals for review of the 1993 Order and
the October MO&O, arguing that the FCC had no
rational basis for the current fin-syn rules." Judge
Posner, once again writing for the court, addressed
each of the restrictions imposed on the networks by
the current fin-syn rules, and concluded that the few
remaining restrictions are not unduly burdensome
upon the networks, especially given the fact that the
rules are set to expire in November 1995.
In his decision, Judge Posner pointed out that the
networks should be able to obtain independent syn-
dicators to negotiate the conditions for airing a pro-
gram "at approximately the same cost at which [the
networks] could perform it themselves." 9 Second, al-
though the networks can diversify their business
practices by syndicating programs purchased from
MM Docket No. 95-39, FCC 95-144, released April 5, 1995
[hereinafter 1995 Review].
91 1993 Order, supra note 8, para. 104.
92 Id. para. 99.
93 47 C.F.R. § 73.661(f) (1993).
94 47 C.F.R. § 73.661(a) (1993). Networks must also make
program contracts available to the Commission upon request. Id.
95 47 C.F.R. § 73.661(b) (1993).
9' October MO&O, supra note 72, para. 72; see also 47
C.F.R. § 73.661(b) (1993).
October MO&O, supra note 72, para. 72.
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. FCC, 29 F.3d 309 (7th Cir.
1994).
" Id. at 315.
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independent producers, the networks did not present
any evidence that this was in fact true when the
FCC solicited comments prior to issuing the 1-993
Order.' Furthermore, Judge Posner noted that al-
though the anti-warehousing restriction might pre-
vent the networks from maximizing their copyright
revenues by establishing a date upon which the net-
works must release prime time programs into syndi-
cation, the number of programs from which in-
creased copyright revenue might be obtained is
minimal given the fact that the networks could not
acquire syndication rights in prime time programs
shown on their networks until March 1993.101
As noted previously, the fin-syn rules are set to
expire on November 15, 1995. However, consistent
with the 1993 Order, the Commission initiated a
proceeding in April 1995 to review the status of
competition in the video marketplace.' 2 Those in
favor of retaining the fin-syn rules have the burden
of demonstrating "an excellent, a compelling reason"
in the 1995 Review for retaining the rules.'03 Propo-
nents of the fin-syn rules have previously argued that
the networks provide the only way to access nearly
one hundred percent of all television households in
the country, which ensures that program suppliers
will not surpass the traditional television networks in
favor of other program providers such as cable net-
works or independent television stations.' 0 4 How-
ever, the Commission's stated purpose in enacting
100 Id.
101 Id.
'03 1995 Review, supra note 90.
103 Id. para. 13; see also Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 29 F.3d
at 316. The Commission also sought comment in the 1995 Re-
view on whether the Commission should eliminate the remaining
fin-syn rules prior to November 15, 1995, if those in favor of
retaining the rules do not meet the requisite burden of proof.
1995 Review, supra note 90, para. 14.
'o See, e.g., Ralph Baruch, Proprietary Interests in Televi-
sion Shows: A Production Company's View, 11 LoV. ENT. L.J.
1, 3 (1991).
10" See, e.g., CBS Reply Comments, supra note 68, at 18
(proclaiming that the increase in the number of independent sta-
tions is not attributable to the fin-syn rules, but rather to a
growth in the demand for advertising time, improvements in
UHF television stations, the carriage of independent stations on
cable television systems, and satellite distribution of national
programming to independent stations).
'" Henry Geller acutely referred to the whole fin-syn pro-
cess as "dividing the baby up." Telephone Interview with Henry
Geller, former FCC General Counsel (Oct. 19, 1993). Likewise,
Robert Corn-Revere declared, "the sum total of the meaning of
the rules is money. Every year [repeal of the rules] can be
delayed, that means more money away from competitors." Tele-
phone Interview with Robert Corn-Revere, Chief Counsel to
former FCC Chairman James H. Quello (Oct. 21, 1993).
the fin-syn rules was to encourage competition and
diversity. The marketplace itself has done more to
accomplish this result than have the rules.' 05 There-
fore, the only reason for maintaining these restric-
tions is to dictate how the economics of the video
marketplace will be divided.""
The Commission's authority to promulgate rules
in the public interest does not extend to distributing
business throughout the marketplace. Even the Com-
mission recognized that, "[ailtering the distribution
of profits among private parties is not, and never has
been, a proper or desirable function of the Commis-
sion."" CBS likewise noted that "FCC intervention
is not justified '[ilf the transfers involve primarily the
distribution of rents between producers and
networks.' ""',
The Commission itself does not believe the fin-syn
rules remain necessary to ensure adequate competi-
tion in the video marketplace.' 09 Indeed, former
FCC Chairman James Quello vividly demonstrated
the rapidity with which the video marketplace is
changing when he pointed out the "real or potential
changes that have occurred in the six short months"
between the adoption of the 1993 Order and the Oc-
tober MO&O." ° Among the changes, several federal
courts declared the cable-telephone company cross-
ownership restriction unconstitutional, clearing the
way for telephone companies to become involved in
program production;". Warner Brothers and Para-
107 1993 Order, supra note 8, para. 42 (quoting Tentative
Decision, supra note 10, para. 206).
1 ,08 CBS Comments, supra note 53, at 10, n.28 (quoting
DOJ Comments, supra note 31, at 27-28); see also RCA v.
United States, 341 U.S. 412, 423 (1951) ("The touchstone of the
[Communications] Act is solely the public interest; the Act is not
a code for the adjustment of conflicting private claims."); FCC v.
Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940) (The
Commission "must place the public interest above private inter-
ests in carrying out its duties.").
109 See, e.g., October MO&O, supra note 72, at 8316 (sepa-
rate statement of Comm'r Andrew C. Barrett) ("It is out of an
abundance of caution about the resulting impact of finsyn's elim-
ination that I support the finsyn sunset provision.").
110 Id. at 8313 (Quello, J., dissenting in part).
" See Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. of Virginia v.
United States, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994). Four federal district
courts have also held the cable-telephone company cross owner-
ship restriction unconstitutional. See U S West, Inc., et al. v.
United States, 855 F. Supp. 1184 (W.D. Wash. 1994), afi'd,
No. 94-35775 (9th Cir. Jan. 3, 1995); NYNEX Corp. v. United
States, No. 93-323-P-C (D. Me. Dec. 8, 1994); Ameritech Corp.
v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ilh 1994); Bell South
Corp. v. United States, 888 F. Supp. 1335,(N.D. Ala. 1994).
See also United States Telephone Ass'n v. United States, No.
1:94CV01961 (D.D.C. Jan. 27, 1995); GTE South, Inc. v.
United States, No. 94-1588-A (E.D. Va. Jan. 13, 1995).
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mount were preparing to launch new broadcast tele-
vision networks;11 Viacom and Paramount an-
nounced their intention to merge, a proposed deal
that attracted a competing bid for Paramount from
the QVC home shopping cable network;- 18 and five
television station groups combined forces to produce
first-run syndicated programming that would allow
them to create an alternative to existing program-
ming sources." '
IV. CONCLUSION
The multitude of changes that have taken place in
the past twenty years, not to mention in the brief
time since the California District Court issued the
opinion establishing an expiration date for the fin-
syn rules, demonstrate that the traditional three net-
works face significant competition not only for view-
ers, but also for program rights. Given this ever-
changing and growing environment, the networks
face an unlimited amount of competition that will
promote diversity on a scale much larger than the
FCC could have possibly imagined in 1970 when the
On October 13, 1993, Bell Atlantic, the Chesapeake & Poto-
mac's parent company, announced its proposed merger with
Tele-Communications Inc. ("TCI"), the nation's largest cable
television operator. See Paul Farhi & Cindy Skrzycki, Bell At-
lantic, Cable TV Giant Joining Forces, WASH. POST, Oct. 13,
1993, at Al; see also Sandra Sugawara & Paul Farhi, Merger to
Create a Media Giant, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1993, at Al (the
merger, if consummated, would create the second-largest corpo-
rate merger ever and the largest communications/ entertainment
merger, with the two companies serving approximately one out
of every four households); Sean Scully & Rich Brown, Wired
Worlds Tie the Knot, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Oct. 18, 1993,
at 6 (some estimates place the Bell-Atlantic-TCI merger as the
largest in U.S. history).
On June 15, 1995, the Senate passed a wide-reaching tele-
communications bill that will allow telephone companies to own
cable systems within their service areas. S. 652, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995). The House Commerce Committee also plans to in-
troduce a bill, H.R. 1551, that would allow cable companies to
enter the telephone marketplace, either on their own or through
joint ventures and mergers with telephone companies). See, e.g.,
Kim McAvoy, House GOP Delivers Deregulatory Goods,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, May 8, 1995, at 6. Congress' attempt
to introduce legislation governing telephone companies' entry
into the cable television marketplace and vice versa is not new.
Congress has been attempting to pass legislation governing
cable-telephone company cross ownership at least since 1993.
See, e.g., Sen. John Danforth, Competition = Quality + Ser-
vice, ROLL CALL, Nov. 15, 1993, at 17 (promoting the ability of
all communications carriers to interconnect, as provided for in
S.1086); see also Rep. Edward Markey, More Than Just Mov-
ies on Demand, ROLL CALL, Nov. 15, 1993, at 6 (discussing his
strategy for allowing an integration of telephone, television, com-
puter and information services).
Commission first adopted the fin-syn rules. The net-
works do not even come close to having a monopoly
in the current video marketplace,11 and whatever
arguments fin-syn supporters might raise about the
"uniqueness" of the networks, this uniqueness will
not get the networks very far if they do not compete
evenly and openly with other program providers.
Producers now have the opportunity to sell their
programming to expanding program providers in ad-
dition to the traditional three television networks.
Therefore, ABC, NBC and ABC would only be
hurting themselves if they were to engage in prac-
tices that the Commission believed the fin-syn rules
were necessary to prevent.
The Commission has finally awakened to the '90s,
with a little assistance from Judge Posner, and real-
ized that the public will not be irreversibly harmed if
the networks are set free. Judge Real of the United
States District Court for the Central District of Cali-
fornia also had no trouble concluding that the video
marketplace has evolved when he granted ABC,
NBC and CBS' motion to release the networks from
financial interest and syndication restraints. Judge
.. WB Network debuted on January 11, 1995, with two
hours of original programming from 8-10 p.m. UPN debuted on
January 16, 1995, with a two-hour premiere of Star Trek: Voy-
ager, followed by two hours of original programming on Janu-
ary 17, 1995. UPN finished first among all six "networks" for
the 8-10 p.m. time slot on January 16, 1995. See Steve Coe,
UPN Beats. . . Everybody, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Jan. 23,
1995, at 4.
When Paramount Communications, Inc. ("Paramount") and
Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. ("Chris-Craft") joined in 1993 to
form UPN, the companies owned 15 TV stations between them,
which covered 31% of U.S. television households. COMM. DAILY,
Oct. 27, 1993, at 2. Paramount signed three additional affiliates,
bringing the total to 13 affiliates, covering 33% of U.S. television
households. COMM. DAILY, Nov. 15, 1993, at 9. Paramount has
provided original and syndicated programs for TV and cable
networks, with such shows as Wings, Frasier, Entertainment
Tonight, The Arsenio Hall Show, The Maury Povich Show,
and Hard Copy.
Ia "In its bid to merge with Paramount, Viacom has been
joined by both NYNEX and Blockbuster Video. This possible
combination would create a single entity that is involved in mo-
tion picture production and distribution, cable channel network-
ing, cable system ownership, television programming, publish-
ing, broadcasting, telecommunications, video rentals, and
interactive multimedia products." October MO&O, supra note
72, at 8313-14 (Quello, J., dissenting in part).
114 Id. at 8313.
.. Recent studies show that ABC, NBC and CBS receive
only 57% of the television viewing audience, down 4% from the
1994 season. Elizabeth Jensen, ABC Is Expected To Be No. I
In Ratings But Total TV Network Share Declines, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 14, 1995, at B5.
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Real concluded that the claims of network monop-
sony or monopoly power exist only in theory, and if
this power should somehow come to exist in reality,
"the [United States of America] with its many orga-
nizations dedicated to the public good and private at-
torneys general, with the aid of the courts, can meet
the challenges presented by such conduct." '11 Judge
Real's November 1993 opinion paves the way for the
networks to have full access to the programming
market in November 1995, in accordance with the
FCC's 1993 Order and 1995 Review. When this
does occur, it is hard to say who among the net-
works, producers and programmers will be the win-
ner - ultimately, the public.
Some network opponents believe that when ABC,
NBC and CBS become completely freed of the fin-
syn rules, the networks will quickly engage in anti-
competitive behavior, perhaps by producing more of
their own programs and then airing those programs
exclusively on the networks' station and cable affili-
ates.11 Given the rapidly changing television pro-
gramming industry, it is hard to see how the net-
works could generate a sufficient audience share to
n United States v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 842 F.
Supp. at 406.
"7 See, e.g., Joe Flint, Fin-syn Will Be Back, Warns For-
mer FCC Commissioner, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Sep. 20,
harm competing stations. However, one unfortunate
result that could arise from the removal of these re-
strictions is the removal of several important "show-
cases" available to independent producers.
UPN and WB Network will probably fill most of
the air time on their networks with programs from
their own production studios. ABC, NBC and CBS
are likely to follow, given the amount of money they
could receive by syndicating their own programs. All
of this could signal trouble for small, independent
producers because although there may very well be a
virtual cornucopia of channels available on which
they could display their programs, if independent
producers do not receive financial support at the be-
ginning, they will be unable to produce any pro-
grams. Many times, the networks are in the best po-
sition to provide this financing. Who knows if the
"owners" of the remaining 497 channels will be able
to afford the cost of producing a new television se-
ries. This remains one of the unknowns not to be
passed by as television travels along the "information
highway."
1993, at 30 (former FCC Commissioner Sherrie Marshall, who
strongly supported the retention of the fin-syn rules in 1991,
predicted that if all the restrictions were lifted, the fin-syn rules
would be back before the FCC in 1995).
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